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In his book Poetic Animals and Animal Souls (2003), Randy Malamud 
outlines the fundamental questions for an ecologically sensitised poet or 
critic:  
Why do animals matter in art? What relation do cultural 
representations of animals have to real animals? What ethical 
relationship and responsibility does the artist have to the animal 
subject? How can art about animals serve as a metaphor, or a 
testing ground, or a microcosm, for our real-world interactions 
with animals? 
(2003, 44) 
Douglas Livingstone’s poem “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Snake” 
is an artwork which addresses precisely these questions, seeking a manner of 
portraying the snake which is neither grossly appropriative nor wholly 
detached, neither ethically empty nor preachy. In its multi-angled structure, 
Livingstone attempts aesthetically “to establish and embellish . . . a contact 
zone with the nonhuman animals who share our world with us, but accepting 
also that there exist considerable venues on either side of this contact zone 
that are, on the one hand, only human, and on the other hand, only 
nonhuman” (Malamud 2003, 45). Even in his more formally scientific work, 
Livingstone argues for the inevitability of such limits to knowledge, and for 
the value of the imagination in addressing them. In his well-known 1986 
paper, “Science and Truth,” Livingstone approvingly quotes Michael 
Whiteman’s assertion of a “Principle of the Whole Before the Parts.” In this 
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counter-Baconian conceptualisation of knowing, Whiteman argues, “’if there 
is the creative determination of the whole . . . the parts which are to be found 
in its intelligible constitution . . . must go with it . . . as if substructure of the 
macroscopic whole’” (qtd. in Livingstone 1986, 100). Livingstone admits 
the force of that ‘if,’ but here lies the origin, or at least support for, his 
notion of some “Creative Principle” which comprises a wholeness behind 
our earth-bound – and culture-bound – fragments of knowledge. He 
confronts the primary philosophical question: “Can we ever know that which 
is apart from us by any other means than subjectively?” (1986, 101), answers 
it by citing “a growing school of thinking which maintains that . . . 
imaginatively expanded cognitive modes can transcend the purely 
subjective” (101). Livingstone goes on to quote one W. Thirring: “Order and 
symmetry must be sought in the underlying field” (105), admitting, however, 
that ‘true’ apprehension of that underlying order might remain eternally 
“chimera-like”: 
Truth seems to reserve for itself a quality of subtlety or 
elusiveness, which would infer that the pursuit of definitive proof 
of the truth, as opposed to truth itself, is reminiscent of trying to 
‘prove’ the existence of God (or a Creative Principle) whereas, by 
all accounts, ‘awareness’ of God is essentially ‘experiential’ … It 
is possible we have to reconcile our pursuit of scientific truth – 
verifying every step of the way, imagining it, longing for it, even 
dreaming of it, spurring ourselves on with the current theory or 
available ratiocinative device, alert always for the dissolution of 
rigidities whose components re-form into new realities which will 
dissolve in their turn – with never actually attaining it. 
(1986, 106) 
We argue here that “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Snake” is a 
poetical effort to embody this ideal, to suggest, through its objectified parts, 
an underlying ‘field’ and ethical stance without rigidifying it, and to 
negotiate the tensions between the subjective and the unitary, between 
evolutionary theory and mythological wisdoms. While a strongly materialist 
view of evolutionary change might baulk at the notion of some quasi-divine 
“Creative Principle,” we accept that this was Livingstone’s view and 
interpret the poem in that light, recognising as he did that “the basic patterns 
of thinking” – and we would include mythic and imaginative, poetic thinking 
amongst these patterns – “are themselves a product of selection” (1986, 
102). So, in this article, we unpack some of the broad mythic resonances of 
the poem, not to suggest that Livingstone was drawing consciously on them 
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all, but to create a fuller echo-chamber within which the poem might attain 
its richest ecological meaning. 
Few animals can be more challenging to an idealistic reaching for an 
‘ecological wholeness’ than a venomous African serpent. Humans generally 
have two very different reactions to snakes – terror and antipathy, or awe 
and amazement. Historically and culturally, however, the snake’s symbolic 
resonances are more complex. In his book Dream Animals, James Hillman 
offers twelve interpretations of what the image of the snake represents. He 
says it symbolises renewal and rebirth; it represents the negative mother; it is 
the embodiment of evil; it is a feminine symbol and is connected with both 
Eve and the mother goddesses; it is a phallus; it represents the material 
earthly world and is the enemy of the spirit; it is a healer; it is a guardian of 
holy and wise men; it brings fertility; it is Death; it is the inmost truth of the 
body; and, finally, it is the symbol for the unconscious psyche (1997, 25-6).  
In the Western world, of course, the Biblical myth of the Fall, and the 
subsequent equation of the serpent with sin, is pervasive, explaining to a 
large degree why the snake is more often reviled than revered. If Eve had not 
heeded the snake and eaten the apple humanity would, as the Hebrew myth 
has it, still be living unconsciously in paradise. In The Power of Myth, the 
doyen of mythographers Joseph Campbell reinterprets the myth of the Fall 
and re-valorises the snake: 
Why was the knowledge of good and evil forbidden to Adam and 
Eve? Without that knowledge, we’d all be a bunch of babies still 
in Eden, without any participation in life. Woman brings life into 
the world. Eve is the mother of this temporal world. Formerly you 
had a dreamtime paradise there in the Garden of Eden – no time, 
no birth, no death – no life. The serpent, who dies and is 
resurrected, shedding its skin and renewing its life, is the lord of 
the central tree, where time and eternity come together. He is the 
primary god, actually, in the Garden of Eden. Yahweh, the one 
who walks there in the cool of the evening, is just a visitor. The 
Garden is the serpent’s place. 
(1991, 54; emphasis added) 
Furthermore, Mircea Eliade says the serpent symbolises chaos, the formless 
and nonmanifested (1989, 19), and Hillman sees the snake as a Jungian 
symbol for the unconscious psyche, both powerful and contradictory: “It is 
always a ‘both’: creative-destructive, male-female, poisonous-healing, dry-
moist, spiritual-material, and many other irreconcilable opposites” (1997, 
26). 
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While these mythic aspects are implicitly and, sometimes, explicitly 
present in Livingstone’s poem, it is human destructiveness towards the snake 
which is foregrounded and, implicitly, the loss of a fruitful connection with a 
“Creative Principle of the universe” (6.1) which is lamented. The poem 
explores Hillman’s “irreconcilable opposites” which reside in the snake 
image and so makes one reconsider one’s attitude towards snakes, at both a 
physical and a symbolic level. After a series of scenarios in which snakes are 
destroyed or tortured, the poem ends on a tentative note of hope, and we will 
argue that this represents the faint possibility of ecological renewal.  
In an autobiographical article “The Other Job – III,” Livingstone says he 
had decided in the 1960s to “devote [his] small energies to healing the 
planet” (1989a, 74). This decision had its genesis during his work as a 
contract underwater diver on the Kariba Dam project, built in 1960 between 
what are now Zambia and Zimbabwe: 
There were bones in the [Zambezi’s] river bed, and I thought of 
the slightly amused and sardonic manner in which some scientists 
referred to the dinosaurs. Yet the dinosaurs were around for 50 to 
150 million years; we’ve been around for only 3 to 5 million . . . 
As the empty tin cans and beer bottles rained down on me and the 
bones in the Zambezi’s mud . . . it seemed to me that it was not 
the planet but humanity itself that was being cursed and harried 
and driven along the path down which the quagga and the dodo 
were propelled, the only difference being that humanity was doing 
it to itself. 
(Livingstone 1989, 74-5) 
Livingstone’s evolutionary perspectives and concerns for the health of the 
planet are implicit in many of his poems, culminating in the key, late 
volume, A Littoral Zone (1991).  As a microbiologist, he was proactive in his 
30-year fight against water pollution off the Natal Coast of South Africa.  A 
Littoral Zone, in which “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Snake” 
appears,1 is a poetic account or “mythical sampling run” (1991, 62n) of this 
scientific work, and is suffused with a tone of what Livingstone called 
“ecological despair” (Robbins 1992, 52). He habitually pointed out that the 
human is the only animal which fouls its own nest (Livingstone 1989a, 1; 
Fazzini 1990, 140), and is “the ultimate polluter through his greed and 
numbers” (Fazzini 1990, 142). As humans, he argues, we no longer know 
our natural place because civilization has fundamentally changed the way we 
live on the Earth. Despite the general acceptance of Darwinian theory, which 
has led to scientific knowledge of the physical evolutionary animalness of 
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our species, we tend not to see ourselves as part of nature. Livingstone 
would doubtless agree with Evan Eisenberg, who explains the evolved 
impossibility of an Edenic (or ecologically attuned) state: 
Once, wilderness was our home . . . we see a garden: a place 
wholly benign, a place of harmony and plenty. We forget that the 
harmony, such as it was, was possibly only because we were still 
beasts, and the plenty only because we were scarce. As soon as we 
become fully human, we begin to ‘fill the earth and subdue it’. We 
begin to destroy Eden, and thereby expel ourselves. 
(1999, 94) 
Livingstone’s poetry repeatedly shows that human ecological attunement is 
an ideal state which is not attainable, that “Eden was ever too far for the 
crawling back” (“Thirteen Ways” 3.4).  
This realistic and pessimistic view of humankind’s environmental 
destructiveness is tentatively counterbalanced by a thread of hope residing in 
what Livingstone calls the human “psychic element” (1991, 62n).  “Thirteen 
Ways of Looking at a Black Snake” evokes this psychic dimension through 
the use of ritual connecting human beings with what Livingstone in this 
poem and elsewhere terms the “Creative Principle of the universe” (see also 
Fazzini 1990, 139; Livingstone 1986, 106). This Creative Principle may be 
read as a metaphoric representation of the forming force of nature, an 
acknowledgement of which is a psychic process that can, at least 
imaginatively, lead towards a greater sense of at-oneness with the Earth. 
This appeal to an overarching Principle is to promote a particular view of 
ecology, one which is founded on the key concept of interconnectedness. 
Charles Darwin’s metaphor of the “entangled bank” for the process of 
evolution on Earth which supports “endless [natural] forms” points to this 
intricately interconnected complexity of biological ecology (1860, 507), and 
more recently Fritjof Capra  uses the metaphors of  “the web of life” and 
“the hidden connections” to express the myriad links in both natural and 
man-made systems (1997, 2003).  In short, ecology is “the study of the 
interactions among organisms and between organisms and between them and 
all aspects of their environment, living (biotic) and non-living 
(abiotic)” (Irwin 2001, 4).  The trope of interconnectivity has arguably 
become as much fad as fact, but has had the value of alerting critics to both 
the infinite breadth and the intrinsic dynamism of these systems. This same 
complexity of the natural world, however, coupled with intensive human 
meddling in these natural systems, arguably makes ecology a self-defeating 
scientific pursuit. As Eisenberg puts it: “The young science of ecology is 
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scrambling to keep up with an object of study that is being scrambled and 
eaten up before its eyes” (1999, 104). If Homo sapiens did not have 
consciousness and the ability to interfere with ‘nature,’ in this view, then an 
ecological balance (natural disasters and achingly slow evolutionary changes 
aside) would largely be the status quo and there would be no need to define 
ecology or to try to manage the planet. The extent of human impacts, 
however, has made essential the extension of ecological studies to applied or 
‘human ecology,’ focusing explicitly on how the human race interacts with 
the environment, if we are to understand our role in preserving our own 
livelihood within the vital and vivifying systems of the planet. The Greek 
roots of the word ecology (oikos as home or dwelling place, and logos as 
relation and as language) point to how this relatively new science is 
concerned with the human relationship to the Earth as a support system or 
‘home.’   
According to Jonathan Bate, the ecologist Elaine Swallow was the first to 
use ecology as an applied term in the late nineteenth century: “For this 
knowledge of right living we have sought a new name . . . as theology is the 
science of religious life, and biology the science of life . . . so let Oekology 
be hence the worthiest of the applied sciences which teaches the principles 
on which to found healthy . . . and happy life” (qtd. in Bate 1991, 36). 
Swallow’s “knowledge of right living” points to the dynamic interplay 
between ecology’s logos (study through symbols) and the oikos (“dwelling 
place” or the biosphere which provides humans with a “living”). Here “right 
living” implies a mutually fructifying and respectful relation – necessarily 
expressed in both language and bodily activity – to the Earth. Fully human 
interaction with nature – interaction which is not only instinctual or 
biological, as in animals – is only possible through conscious thought 
expressed in language (logos). 
Douglas Livingstone’s work shows that he grappled persistently with the 
conundrum of human consciousness. He clearly understood and applied 
Darwinian perspectives in his poetry, but there is strong evidence that he did 
not hold a purely non-teleological and materialist view of the world. For 
example, the opening lines of “An Evolutionary Nod to God” (1991, 18) 
acknowledge the possibility of a first cause: “Perhaps creationists are nearly 
right: / an enigmatic principle formed cells.” And, more convolutedly, in “A 
Darwinian Preface” (1991, 7), the speaker draws on the human capacity to 
love as a stay against the “nocturnal terrorisms” of a purely materialist view 
of the world. Given Livingstone’s various references to a Creative Principle 
as the forming force behind nature, we argue that he is a kind of Romantic 
materialist who uses the best of the Romantic tradition – an appreciative awe 
of nature and a belief that the human imagination is crucial – and combines 
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this with an acute scientific awareness (see Stevens 2004, 55-6). Romantic 
materialism can be described as the view that the physical world is made up 
of matter and energy and is subject to immutable laws of nature, but that this 
fact does not preclude a reverence for the myriad interconnections and 
miraculous existence of life. Gillian Beer succinctly describes Romantic 
materialism as “a sense of the clustering mystery of a material 
universe” (2000, 142). 
Because we as humans are no longer simplistically animals and do not 
live purely instinctually on the Earth, our relationship to nature has become, 
unavoidably, also a symbolic one, our symbolic systems at once dividing us 
from and connecting us to the world. Livingstone’s poem “Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at a Black Snake” explores this symbolic connection, even as it 
points to the limitations of our sense of belonging on earth. In this sense, 
Livingstone is echoing the growing concern about human degradation of the 
entire planet’s ecosystems. For example, in James Lovelock’s view (1987), 
the oikos is the whole Earth, a superorganism which supports life on the 
planet for which he coined the term “Gaia,” to which Livingstone himself 
adverts for its poetic as much as its scientific power (see “Road Back” 1991,  
61n). Since statistics and facts about species extinction, diminishing 
ecosystems, denuded rain forests, and global warming are apparently having 
minimal effect on destructive human behaviours, perhaps poetry can 
persuade, as Jonathan Bate urges in The Song of the Earth (2000)? The 
power of myth, metaphor and symbol may yet help lead to an ecological 
awareness, using as a catalyst the human capacity to imagine.  Thomas Berry 
claims that even in our modern condition the four primary archetypal 
symbols, “the Journey, the Great Mother, the Cosmic Tree and the Death-
Rebirth symbol . . . constitute a psychic resource of enormous import for 
establishing ourselves as a viable species in a viable life system on the planet 
Earth” (1999, 70). 
Ecologically-orientated literary criticism (simplistically, ecocriticism) 
treats precisely with these relationships between literary symbolisations and 
human behaviours within the natural world, today particularly with global 
ecosystemic degradation in mind. Most simply put, “ecocriticism is the study 
of the relationship between literature and the physical 
environment” (Glotfelty and Fromm 1996, xviii). More precisely, literary 
ecocriticism is the analysis of literature’s expression of humanity’s place on 
Earth, our oikos or home. We would extend this by suggesting that literary 
ecocriticism is also about a certain lost art of reading the land and its 
denizens, and about performing that reading through a mode of language 
which is not “just one more narcissistic avenue by which our culture 
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celebrates ourselves” (Malamud 2003, 57). Science avowedly uses 
objectified fact to explain the physical workings of the world, but it is clear 
that Livingstone found its materialist basis inadequate to what he 
experienced as the world’s mystery. Poetry, on the other hand, seeks to 
explore our imaginative engagement with the world by using metaphor and 
symbol: through imaginative identification we are able to relate to – even 
commune with – nature, at least up to a point. A failure of imagination can 
lead to the kind of destructive acts described in “Thirteen Ways.” Jonathan 
Bate, in reflecting on “the relationship with earthly things that is turned into 
language by the poetry of dwelling” (2000, 280), claims that “reanimation 
occurs in the human mind, the environment of the imagination” (281) and 
adds: 
The poetic articulates both presence and absence: it is both the 
imaginary recreation and the trace on the sand which is all that 
remains of the wind itself. The poetic is ontologically double 
because it may be thought of as ecological in two senses: it is 
either (both?) a language (logos) that restores us to our home 
(oikos) or (and?) a melancholy recognizing that our only home 
(oikos) is language (logos). 
(281) 
All the above in mind, then, we argue that “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a 
Black Snake”can only fully be read ecocritically.  At the most obvious level, 
the poem depicts a human betrayal of the snake and its world, and hence a 
betrayal of our own psychic connection with the natural world – an 
ecologically unviable position. The black snake functions as a layered 
metaphor for the forces of creation and destruction, for Death and Rebirth, 
and for humankind’s perceptions of (or ways of experiencing) nature. 
Humanity was given consciousness when, the Hebrew myth has it, Eve 
chose to taste of the knowledge of good and evil.  The poem explores what 
humankind has done with this gift of consciousness and how we continue to 
abnegate the gift of life. It does not paint a pretty picture. The black snake 
does not symbolise cosmic evil, but rather nature’s victimisation at the hands 
of human evil or cruelty induced by ignorance and fear. So what has 
happened to the knowledge of good? This is the tension upon which the 
poem is based – and it matters little that such a paradisal state of pure good 
might never have existed. As Jung’s notion of the archetype expresses, such 
a state is a consistent myth of human consciousness almost everywhere, and, 
as Eisenberg demonstrates throughout his book The Ecology of Eden, 
arguably its most socially fruitful. 
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Wallace Stevens’ poem “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a 
Blackbird” (1991) to which Livingstone obviously alludes – down to the 
similar number of lines and the “epigrammatic and elliptic” style (Vendler 
1970, 75) – seems at first blush a more “Edenic” view of human-natural 
relations. The presence of the blackbird often indicates natural harmony: “A 
man and a woman and a blackbird / Are one” (line 9); “… the blackbird is 
involved / In what I know” (lines 30-1); “The river is moving / The 
blackbird must be flying” (line 45). Nevertheless, Stevens’ poem also shows 
that the human relationship to nature is elusive and fraught: 
He rode over Connecticut 
In a glass coach. 
Once, a fear pierced him, 
In that he mistook 
The shadow of his equipage 
For blackbirds. 
(lines 38-43) 
For both poets, the elusiveness is entailed in limitations on human vision: 
Stevens explicitly uses the image of the eye (section 1), and the use of 
“see” (7) and “sight” (9, 10), while in Livingstone’s poem the act of seeing 
is rather implied through the descriptions of the scenes. Stevens’ poem 
contains two sections (6, qtd. below, and 11) which indicate human myopia, 
symbolised by looking through glass: 
Icicles filled the long window 
With barbaric glass. 
The shadow of the blackbird 
Crossed it, to and fro. 
The mood 
Traced in the shadow 
An indecipherable cause. 
(lines 18-24) 
Adalaide Kirby Morris suggests that the glass image refers to the fallen 
human state where we can only see “through a glass, darkly” (1 Cor. 13) and 
that “For both Saint Paul and Stevens, we know truth only through its 
refraction in reality. We see only in part” (1974, 36). As we will see, 
Livingstone also employs the image of seeing dimly through glass. Both 
poets, it seems clear, regard physical seeing as metonymic of what Helen 
Vendler has called “the imagination and its uneasy rapport with 
reality” (1970, 3). In discussing Harmonium, the collection that contains 
“Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” Frank Kermode writes: 
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Reality in Harmonium, as throughout Stevens, is that which the 
imagination, in different ways at different times and in different 
places, must contend with, compound with . . . It is always that 
upon which the light of the mind must beat, illuminating, 
warming, but not changing it. It matters where you see it from . . . 
It matters also when one is looking; for the relation of the mind to 
reality is always changing . . . The fictions necessarily grow 
obsolete; ‘the plum survives its poems’ [‘The Comedian as the 
Letter C’]. Stevens has in mind . . . something like Bergson’s 
fonction fabulatrice, a mental power evolved to assist adaptation 
to the environment and ensure comfort and survival. Poets, with 
this power, once made gods and myths, but these are irrelevant to 
modern reality. Now the same power must be our defence against 
the poverty of fact. 
(1960, 38-39) 
Both poems enact this ever-changing “relation of the mind to reality” in 
presenting multiple points-of-view on a single iconic animal. Stevens, in 
offering thirteen ways of looking at the common American blackbird, invites 
one to look beyond the ordinary and to dispel that “poverty of fact” which 
entails the absence of imaginative happiness (Kermode 1960, 39). In 
following Stevens, Livingstone similarly that individual views of the snake 
(and of nature more widely) is frequently impoverished and blinkered by 
inadequate imaginative identification. 
A further similarity lies in the choice of black entities. Black is primal, 
originary: as Harold Bloom puts it, “the blackbird is Stevens’ first thinker of 
the First Idea. And so he mixes in everywhere” (1977, 105). Both Bloom and 
Helen Vendler state that in “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird” the 
colour black serves as the emblem of Ananke, of fate conceived as necessity. 
Vendler, drawing on lines from Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery, 
describes the Ananke as “the black principle, the eccentric which is the base 
of design, the strict, the final, the intrinsic, the limiting, the temporal” (1970, 
75; cf. Bloom 1977, 105). In this reading, the blackbird also symbolises the 
natural order of things – evolutionary theory, mortality, death, contingency – 
aspects of which humans struggle to identify with:  
O thin men of Haddam,  
Why do you imagine golden birds?  
Do you not see how the blackbird  
Walks around the feet  
Of the women about you? 
(section 7) 
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Livingstone, in choosing the more loaded image of the snake, even more 
strongly incorporates elements of the limiting, the temporal, contingency, 
death. He also further extends the idea of Necessity (the biological) into the 
area of the spiritual and cultural, through his references to the Creative 
Principle and ancient rites. Both poets treat of the perhaps ineradicable 
tension between the necessity of identification with nature, even as it eludes 
and threatens us. 
“Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Snake” is the tougher of the two.  
In what follows, we will argue that the poem implies (a) that man’s 
destructive relationship with nature is based on fear, betrayal and cruelty; (b) 
that humankind’s destructiveness towards the black snake, for Livingstone, 
represents humanity’s lost connection to nature; and (c) that the snake also 
represents earthly (as opposed to heavenly) life where reverence towards the 
Creative Principle behind nature is offered as a means of understanding the 
oikos, a sense of place, and so of reconnecting with the natural world. 
Fear, Betrayal and Cruelty 
In two early poems, both from his 1964 volume Sjambok, Livingstone 
gestured towards the emotion of fear of snakes, and of fear producing 
cruelty. In “Leviathan” (2004, 37), a puff-adder “fatter than a stocking of 
pus” swallows a “dozing lizard,” a shocking demise leading the poet to 
imagine and mythologise his own: “O Jonah, to tumble to / those sickly 
black depths, / slick walled, implacably black.” In “The Killers” (2004, 56-
7), one killer – a cobra – confronts another – the human speaker, who then 
arms himself with a shotgun with which he finally despatches the 
threatening snake.  The fear is there, an arguably necessary ruthlessness – 
and a tinge of guilt: “I had to shoot: I mean / that now her limp grey life lies 
understood.” It is an ironic and pointless kind of understanding of the power 
of the snake that accrues only once it is dead. In “Thirteen Ways of Looking 
at a Black Snake,” these intimately bound reactions of fear and betrayal are 
more deftly developed. 
Several of the poem’s three- to four-line sections vividly portray varieties 
of human cruelty or destructiveness, these being interspersed with sections 
which offer comment on the accompanying dimensions of betrayal, 
incomprehension, and the survival of the knowledge of evil. The 
juxtapositions between blindness and self-reflectiveness enact what we term 
humanity’s lost connection. Section 1 introduces an indefinite or universal 
betrayer, through the reference to “an Iscariot,”2 who (like the speaker of 
“The Killers”) is initially unaware of and then surprised by the snake: 
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The rubber snake dangling from 
the rear-view mirror in the next lane 
evokes an Iscariot awakening with a start 
to see a black snake worm out of his heart. 
(1.1-4) 
The manufactured, even commodified “rubber snake” ironically evokes, as 
good symbols do, a self-reflectiveness, figured as a snake rather like a 
maggot which, as it “worm[s]” out of the human “heart,” connotes 
rottenness and self-destructive betrayal. Betrayal of the other, then, entails 
self-betrayal, while this Iscariot’s reaction also indicates a denial that the 
self-destruction and self-betrayal exist. The theme of betrayal remains 
implicit throughout the poem, but its effects rather than the betrayal itself are 
examined. 
The second section, compressed as a haiku, depicts the first of three 
scenarios of human cruelty against the snake (and is followed by similarly 
chilling scenes of intentional savagery in sections 7 and 11): 
After the barbecue, a hubbub: 
someone has caught a black snake. 
The half-drum of coals is still glowing. 
(2.1-3) 
In section 4 a black snake is also about to be killed by a man, a bespectacled 
gardener who is poised with the “open jaws” of his hedge cutters. Intentional 
cruelty is not evident in this section which hints, rather, at an unthinking 
destructiveness. The “pebble-lenses” of the short-sighted gardener are a 
metaphor for humankind’s myopic (non)relationship to nature and are 
symptomatic of a deeper destructiveness which is explored more fully in 
section 6.  
Section 6 can be read as a summary of the content of the poem thus far: 
accepted norms, that is, “orthodoxies,” have superseded humanity’s intuitive 
understanding of the world. The section opens with a statement: 
The Creative Principle of the universe 
used to be feminine 
before it was swallowed by the black snake 
of orthodoxies. 
(6.1-4) 
The black snake has become, for humans, a symbol of destruction rather 
than creation. Or, to put it another way, the feminine (or perpetually fecund) 
oikos has been “swallowed” or superseded by the masculine (linguistic and 
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rigidifying) logos. This is not to say that the eternal, creative feminine has 
ceased to exist, but that it has been subjugated or concealed by masculinist 
orthodoxy. Without the rejuvenating influence of respectful creativity (or 
imagination), orthodoxy can become destructive. 
Livingstone’s feminine “Creative Principle” may be read as a version of 
Mother Earth or Gaia. Joseph Campbell connects the images of the serpent 
and an originary goddess, noting that “We have Sumerian seals from as early 
as 3500 B.C. showing the serpent and the tree and the goddess, with the 
goddess giving the fruit of life to a visiting male” (1991, 55). The Eve of the 
Hebrew myth is arguably a reworking of this goddess myth. So, the serpent 
and the goddess, or Livingstone’s feminine “Creative Principle of the 
universe,” are anciently interlinked. Monica Sjöö also makes the connection: 
“Everywhere in world myth and imagery, the Goddess-Creatrix was coupled 
with the sacred serpent. In Egypt she was the Cobra Goddess . . . Isis was 
also pictured as a Serpent-Goddess” (1991, 57-8). Campbell further writes: 
“Myths of the Great Goddess teach compassion for all living beings. There 
you come to appreciate the real sanctity of the earth itself, because it is the 
body of the Goddess” (1991, 207). It is the loss of the appreciation of this 
sanctity which Livingstone portrays – and implicitly laments – in this 
section. Campbell traces the rise of male-orientated myth (Livingstone’s 
“black snake / of orthodoxies”) back to the overthrow of the mother goddess 
Tiamat at the time of the rise of the city of Babylon. He describes Tiamat as 
the “All-Mother Goddess . . . the Abyss, the inexhaustible Source” (1991, 
213), destroyed by the young god Marduk of Babylon who then “becomes – 
apparently – the creator” (214). Campbell does, however, offer a possible 
resolution: “I would see three situations here. First, the early one of the 
Goddess, when the male is hardly a significant divinity. Then the reverse, 
when the male takes over her role. And finally, then, the classical stage, 
where the two are in interaction” (216). This final stage could be called a 
state of ecological equilibrium or attunement. Livingstone’s poem, even as it 
alludes to this mythic nexus, strongly suggests that this attunement is now all 
but a lost ideal.  
Livingstone’s use of the word “orthodoxies” encapsulates the artificiality 
of religion’s attachment to doctrine, or what Camille Paglia calls the “sky-
cult” of the Apollonian and Judeo-Christian traditions which “seek to 
surmount or transcend nature” (1992, 8). The contrast between “Creative” 
and “orthodoxies” reflects the movement from the earth-centred or natural to 
the masculinist and artificial. Perhaps Livingstone is intimating that, through 
religion, humankind has re-ordered the relations of power and made a 
symbolic scapegoat of the snake’s creativity which is now depicted as evil. 
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Nietzsche says, “Almost everything we call ‘higher culture’ is based on the 
spiritualization of cruelty” (qtd. in Paglia 1992, 29). Arguably, Livingstone 
similarly depicts religion or “orthodoxies” as a form of misguided “higher 
culture.”  
Section 6’s opening statement, quoted above, is followed by a question:  
Is that why, tonight, a votary will raid 
the Snake Park 
armed with a forked stick and a panga? 
(6.5-7) 
This “votary,” a devoted worshipper or a chthonian cultist who aims to catch 
the black snake with “a forked stick” and kill it with a panga or African 
knife, is evidently misguided: it is not the snake which is the problem but the 
human confusion over what the snake represents as well as a masculine, 
artificial, rational or Apollonian view of the world. The votary’s actions are 
symptomatic of humankind’s stunted knowledge of good and evil, the lines’ 
jarring juxtapositions pointing to the chasm between ancient ways and 
contemporary practice. The word “votary” sounds incongruously ancient or 
religious in relation to Durban city’s modern, artificial “Snake Park”: it 
ironically posits that the Park, its snakes kept in captivity as exhibits, has 
replaced the temple or religious place of worship in modern society – yet the 
intention is murderous. Alternatively, the concept of worship itself has 
become irretrievably debased, and the intended “raid” of the worshipper or 
“votary” deeply, almost sarcastically, ironic. If we assume the votary is 
female and is intent on eradicating modern religion’s masculinist “black 
snake / of orthodoxies,” these three lines intimate a profound confusion that 
leads to destructive physical acts which undermine the very object of 
worship itself.  
Humankind’s Lost Connection 
The conventional ‘cure’ for confusion, it is often proposed, is reason; reason, 
an opposing view holds, is masculinist, mechanistic, and destructive of the 
natural. Camille Paglia notes that Apollo, conventionally symbolic of the 
masculine and rational, “is fabricated form. He is exclusion and 
exclusiveness.” But she also claims: “Apollo can swerve from nature, but he 
cannot obliterate it” (1992, 73; 14). Livingstone explores this ambivalent 
relationship; his poem in its entirety suggests (through the metaphor of the 
masculine–feminine opposition) that reason and reverence towards the 
Creative Principle are both necessary.  
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This masculine–feminine dynamic resurfaces in section 10’s examination 
of what is left of a pagan ritual: 
The remains of an arcane Roman rite survive 
involving women, their secret recesses 
and devenomed black snakes. 
The lay art of devenoming is lost; 
the snakes now merely lethargic from drugged smoke. 
(10.1-5) 
The description of this ritual stirs what Paglia would call the chthonian, and 
points to a more hopeful theme of the snake and humankind cohabiting in an 
earthly form of paradise. Section 10, in part, valorises female sexuality 
(women with their “secret recesses”), but also implies a diminishing of both 
masculine (“snakes now merely lethargic”) and feminine sexuality. The 
serpent is not merely a symbol for the penis – the masculine side of the 
Great Mother is often expressed through images of serpents (Paglia 1992, 
43) – but is now devenomed, an image for the waning of creative, natural 
power. This ancient rite has been further modified because even the “art of 
devenoming” is now lost and drugged snakes are used instead. 
The “lethargic” snakes in this section echo the dangling rubber snake 
suspended on the car’s rear-view mirror in the first section of the poem. 
Ambiguity or contradiction are key to Livingstone’s methods here: the rear-
view mirror implies self-reflection or of another reality, but the most 
powerful symbol of that reality is reduced to a powerless bauble. Similarly, 
in section 9’s bizarre and elusive depiction of a “white room” (an operating 
theatre or a madman’s cell?), the scene is illuminated by “a black snake hung 
from the ceiling, / an electric light-bulb in its fangs” (9.3-4). A “distant 
generator” as the source of power locates the surreal scene in rural Africa 
and portrays, perhaps, the emasculation of the snake’s symbolic power over 
life and death, or the reduction of the natural to the technological. 
In all three cases, only impotent vestiges of the chthonic and ritualistic 
survive, symbolic of what humanity has “lost”: not only the common or “lay 
art of devenoming,” but also our ecological intuition. Humanity no longer 
understands either the organic power of ritual or the pragmatic crafts of 
coexistence.  Theologian Thomas Berry, too, bemoans the loss of ritual in 
modern life but optimistically clings to the ecological connections implicit in 
ritual: 
Ancient rituals through which we communicated with the Earth 
and fostered its productivity may no longer seem fully effective. 
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Yet they do express a profound respect for the mystery of the 
Earth. It would be philosophically unrealistic, historically 
inaccurate, and scientifically unwarranted to say that the human 
and the Earth no longer have an intimate and reciprocal emotional 
relationship. 
(1999, 175) 
In “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Snake,” Livingstone states that this 
“reciprocal emotional relationship” has been “swallowed” and replaced by 
“the black snake / of orthodoxies.” The ancient spiritual connection of man 
to nature has been all but lost, for only vestiges of the ancient rite survive. A 
tentative hope rests in the fact that something of humankind’s mythic 
memory “remains.”  
The Necessary Search for an Earthly Paradise 
The idea of a lost earthly paradise as a trope for this tentative hope is 
explicitly examined in section 3: 
Baked dry by the sun, the stiff black snake 
forms a parched question-mark between 
highwater-mark and the dunes. 
Eden was ever too far for the crawling back.  
(3.1-5) 
The dead snake, lying on the beach beyond the littoral zone and forming the 
shape of a question mark, is literally stranded and out of its natural habitat, 
the bush if it is a land snake or the sea if it is a water snake. It is 
metaphorically exiled from “Eden.” Livingstone here cryptically conflates 
the ocean and Eden, asking his readers to make a quantum mythological leap 
from the garden to the sea as the place of origin of life-forms.3 At the same 
time, he asks us to question our understanding or apprehension of the nature 
of paradise, the role of the snake in that paradise, and the role of death itself 
as a mark of exile. The dead snake’s condition, “Baked dry” and “parched,” 
portrays both literal desiccation and the metaphorical dislocation of the value 
of the snake-symbol. In death, it poses a life question: why has humanity 
reviled the snake and refused to see it as part of the web of life? Is it not in 
fact the revulsion and refusal which is causing catastrophe? The snake 
becomes more than an ironic question mark in the sand; it signifies that 
humankind has denigrated and ignored the snake as an original key to 
knowledge. It is therefore, in actuality, the human race which is stranded 
beyond the highwater mark, without recourse to the littoral zone where, in 
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Livingstone’s overarching bioregional mythos, “humanity’s physical and 
psychic elements” can come together (1991, 62n). And the final twist is that 
there is (and probably never was) any hope of reconciliation: “Eden was ever 
too far for the crawling back.” 
Section 3’s examination of the lost Eden is followed by another version 
of the search for an earthly paradise in section 5, which alludes to the 
Biblical great flood, engineered by God to get rid of the evil on Earth. The 
deluge myth is reworked, using the narrative of a canoeist’s mini-shipwreck 
and “long angled swim” (5.2) for survival. As the canoe-less speaker, out of 
his element, swims to shore he sees a black snake “zig-zagging lithely on the 
flood” (5.3-4). The snake survives the flood independently of the ark, is even 
at home. If Eden marked humanity’s fall into the knowledge of good and 
evil or, narrowly, sin, the flood marks an unsuccessful attempt to get rid of 
that sin – not only sin in the restricted sense of moral offence, but as 
symptomatic of present-day human knowledge or consciousness. 
This encounter shows a human dis-location, but at least human and snake 
are not in conflict, hinting at a tentative reconciliation.  Two other figures in 
this poem show a more benign, although still confused, attitude towards the 
black snake. Section 8 includes the themes of Eden, innocence and betrayal. 
It describes a child’s distress and helplessness in the face of parental strife as 
he watches “a black snake squirm down a crack in the rockery” (8.2). The 
snake is a reflection of the adult “voices coiling” in argument. Why does the 
child seek out the snake, forcing “his hand into the hole: deeper, deeper”? 
Whether literal or figurative, this action is anathema, innocent, dangerous, 
even suicidal. The child’s active seeking out of the snake echoes the myth of 
Eve’s temptation in the Garden of Eden. In its own garden, the child pursues 
the snake in a quest, perhaps, for company or common cause, but it can 
surely only result in tragedy – in a new knowledge of good and evil. One 
implication is that this will help him make sense of his parents’ reason for 
fighting. Yet the physical danger of this act remains palpable and chilling. 
In the penultimate section, the protagonist makes an “exhausted 
slide” (12.3) into his sleeping bag and finds a snake inside it. His “slide” 
echoes the movement of a snake, as does the crawling of the child in section 
8. Both these personae (the innocent child and the nature lover camping in 
the wilderness) appear to have a certain affinity with the snake. In this 
section the snake is not killed, is merely felt as “a chill muscled 
presence” (12.4) where “muscled” hints at a possible return to power, and 
“chill” serves as a certain reminder of human limits, and that old, archetypal 
fear of the serpent. As always, Livingstone leaves possible outcomes to the 
reader’s imagination. 
In the final section, 13, the black snake finds freedom:  
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A ribbon of black writhes silently through the bush; 
the intermittent moon flickers over – are those scales? 
(13.1-2) 
This image offers some relief after the bombardment of human cruelty and 
betrayal delivered in the preceding sections of the poem. The snake evinces 
grace, stealth and possible pain as it “writhes silently” away (13.1). It 
becomes an image of the bearer of both its own and human suffering. The 
final line is loaded with innuendo, emphasised by the use of the question 
mark and the instability of the moonlight. But the poet does catch a 
flickering glimpse of the snake as it disappears into the bush, returning to its 
natural habitat. The “scales” could be over his eyes, a trope for the human 
inability to understand clearly the creative power of nature (as hinted at in 
section 4 through the myopia of the gardener with his “pebble-lenses”). 
Alternatively, the “scales” might literally be the scales on the snake, 
connecting it with its order of reptiles, and even mythologically to the 
thrilling danger of dragons. Thirdly, it might refer to a justiciary balance or 
natural order of things, as the regulatory function of the moon on the sea’s 
tides is evoked in the poem’s final line. Further, both the moon and the snake 
symbolise renewal. Joseph Campbell explains: “The power of life causes the 
snake to shed its skin, just as the moon sheds its shadow. The serpent sheds 
its skin to be born again, as the moon its shadow to be born again. They are 
equivalent symbols” (1991, 53). Campbell further notes that the serpent 
carries in itself the sense of both the fascination and the terror of life (53), 
and that the “interplay of man and nature is illustrated in this relationship 
with the serpent” (54). Few modern poems, perhaps, capture this dynamic so 
succinctly as does Douglas Livingstone’s. In liberating the snake into this 
ambivalent space, he echoes Marianne Moore: “we dissent from the serpent 
as deity,” Moore says, replacing superstition with “a certain ritual of awe” – 
and the poem itself is that ritual (qtd. in Malamud 2003, 101).  Moore and 
Livingstone alike depict an “acceptance of limitations in the human 
epistemological consciousness of animals,” which is “a necessary stance for 
the ideal account that we may render of animals in human art” (Malamud 
2003, 98). 
“Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Snake” might be seen as a 
distinctively ecological progression beyond, if not an obvious response to, 
some well-known ‘cobra’ poems by earlier South African poets. In “To My 
Pet Cobra,” Roy Campbell, with characteristic derring-do and egotism, 
fondles the lethal cobra and hopes to take on some of its power in order to 
blight his critics. In a later poem, “Salute,” Sidney Clouts’s ironic greeting 
“Good morning, gentle cobra, are you well?” is intended to challenge the 
complacencies of the “Very Profound Men” of Europe who have dared 
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trespass into Africa. Livingstone’s approach reaches beyond the narrower 
parameters of both these poems: though an ecocritical reading of Campbell 
and Clouts is certainly possible, it is essential in Livingstone’s case. In 
presenting, in almost Nietzschean mode, multiple views of the black snake, 
unfocussed on a single ego or dominant ‘truth,’ Livingstone encapsulates the 
ecological complexity of nature’s presence in all of us: “Each of us is a 
walking universe of completely disparate worlds, continents and seas, with 
immense and differing populations, all organized together into some sort of 
functioning coherence with the single inherent determination (if we are sane) 
to preserve life and what is left of our planet” (1976, 143). Quixotically, 
such preservation includes that which is potentially fatal to us. This, like 
many of Livingstone’s poems, “resist[s] the easy logic of dualism, speaking 
rather of an attitude situated somewhere between despair and dogged 
resilience” (Martin 1999, 237). The crucial word, perhaps, is “sane.” In 
Livingstone’s presentation, humankind (to echo T. S. Eliot) cannot bear too 
much of the reality of what the snake represents, and therefore, peering 
through “pebble lenses,” ignorantly or deliberately lapses into cruelty in 
order to repress, manipulate and control nature. This poem points to a new, 
more sane way of seeing in order to shift from a position of antipathy and 
terror to one of knowledgeable awe: the black snake as a metonym for the 
power and omnipresence of the natural, as well as for the reverence of lost 
ritual. Hence, the final section of the poem offers a glimmer of resolution or 
hope, through a falling away of the scales before the human eyes, a possible 
freeing of the snake into its natural habitat, and a rebalancing of the scales 
through understanding or ecological awareness. In a manner perhaps 
surprising in so rigorous a scientist, Livingstone intimates that an 
imaginative or psychic shift is our only hope if wisdom and compassion – or 
a state of ecological equilibrium – are to be attained. 
The final section also intimates that the snake (and therefore nature) will 
survive. But will the human race? Only if we can reconnect and coexist non-
destructively with the “muscled presence.” 
NOTES 
1. A Littoral Zone has been reprinted in A Ruthless Fidelity: The Collected 
Poems of Douglas Livingstone (2004, 269). 
2. Judas of Iscariot betrayed Christ and so was directly instrumental in his 
crucifixion. There may be a connection, through ‘an Iscariot,’ with the unlucky 
number 13. The superstition of its being unlucky for 13 people to be seated at a table 
has its roots in Norse mythology where Loki, the god of strife, intruded on a banquet 
at Valhalla and Balder was slain. For Christians, this superstition was confirmed 
through the last supper of Christ and his 12 disciples (Brewer 1993, 1075). 
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3. In scientific circles the sea is generally accepted as the place of origin of life 
on Earth. Gillian Beer explains this poetically: “Evolutionary theory implied a new 
myth of the past: instead of the garden at the beginning, there was the sea and the 
swamp” (2000, 118); and James Lovelock cautiously says it is “reasonably certain” 
that life on the planet began in the sea (1987, 87). 
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